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Patents, Innovation, and Performance of  
Venture Capital-backed IPOs 
 
Abstract 
 
We study the predictive power of patents on the long-run performance of venture 
capital (VC)-backed initial public offerings (IPOs). We show that VC-backed IPOs that 
have at least one patent at the time of the IPO substantially outperform other VC-backed 
IPOs, with 3-year buy-and-hold market-adjusted returns of -7.1% vs. -23.3%. On average, 
VC-backed IPOs without patents perform similarly to non-VC-backed IPOs. We also 
report that VC-backed IPOs from 1981-1998 outperformed other IPOs, but the pattern 
has reversed for IPOs from 1999-2006. Although a smaller proportion of non-VC-backed 
IPOs possess patents, those with patents also outperform those without patents. 
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1. Introduction 
Innovation is vital to companies’ productivity, future profitability, and competitive 
advantages, and is an important driver of economic growth and social welfare (Griliches, 
1992; Hall, 1996). Recent literature shows that venture capital (VC) plays a favorable  
effect in nurturing high growth startups (Gompers, 1995), yields higher valuation and 
positive changes in operating performance (Chemmanur,  Simonyan, and  Tehranian, 
2013), and spurs innovation (Kortum and Lerner, 2000). For example, Kortum and 
Lerner show that increases in VC activities in an industry are associated with 
significantly higher patenting rates. Chemmanur,  Loutskina, and  Tian (2014) show that 
corporate VC has even stronger ability in nurturing innovation due to technology fit and 
tolerance for failure. Governments around the world have been eager to encourage VC 
activity with the aim of boosting innovation (Lerner, 2012).   
Brav and Gompers (1997), Chan, Cooney, Kim, and Singh (2008), and Field and 
Lowry (2009) find that VC-backed initial public offerings (IPOs) significantly 
outperform non-VC-backed IPOs, and that VC-backed IPOs do not significantly 
underperform benchmarks matched by size and book-to-market ratio.1 They argue that 
most IPOs are young, high growth companies, which are prone to information asymmetry 
and agency problems. Since VCs specialize in identifying, evaluating, and nurturing these 
types of firms, they posit that VC-backed IPOs are on average better quality companies 
than non-VC-backed companies. If the market fails to incorporate the importance of 
venture capital in the pricing of IPOs, VC investment will predict long-run stock price 
outperformance. Since VC-backed IPOs are renowned for innovation, we focus on VC-
                                                             
1 Brav and Gompers (1997) use IPOs from 1975-1992, and both Chan, Cooney, Kim, and Singh (2008) and 
Field and Lowry (2009) use IPOs from 1980-2000.  
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backed IPOs and investigate the effects of innovation, as measured by the possession of 
patents, for their long-run stock price performance, although we also study the impact of 
patents on the returns of non-VC-backed IPOs.  
Many papers document the long-run underperformance of IPOs in the U.S. and 
elsewhere. The evidence on the long-run performance of IPOs can be summarized as 
follows: On average, IPOs have low returns in the three years after the IPO, measured 
from the first closing market price. The low returns are due to both successful market 
timing effects (Greenwood and Hanson, 2012) and abnormal performance relative to the 
market. The IPO universe, however, is intensive in small growth stocks with high capital 
expenditures, high R&D expenditures, and weak profitability, all of which have been 
shown to explain cross-sectional patterns in stock returns generally (Bessembinder and 
Zhang, 2012). Thus, one question is whether, after one controls for more general known 
cross-sectional effects, does knowing whether or not a stock is a recent IPO contain any 
incremental return predictability effect? A second question is whether there are reliable 
cross-sectional effects in IPO abnormal performance. 
We use patent grants prior to the IPO as a proxy for innovation for a comprehensive 
sample of 2,254 VC-backed IPOs from 1981-2006. A firm is classified as a VC-backed 
IPO with patents if it has at least one patent grant before the IPO date; otherwise, it would 
be classified as without patents. We collect firms’ patent grant information before the 
IPO from the NBER’s patent database, which contains the USPTO grant date for all 
patent filings that were subsequently granted between January 1, 1976 and December 31, 
2006. The NBER database reports patents on the basis of company names at the time of 
the patent grant, and many buyout-backed IPOs and spinoffs have changed their names or 
5 
 
made acquisitions prior to the IPO, resulting in a lower correlation between holding 
patents that are material to their business and what is reported in the NBER database. 
This is a second important reason why we focus on VC-backed IPOs. 
We acknowledge that patents are not a perfect measure of innovation (for example, 
many inventions are protected as trade secrets, such as the formula for Coca-Cola), but 
patents remain the most important and direct measure of the quality and extent of firms’ 
innovations (Griliches, 1990). They are valuable materialized innovation outputs and are 
actively traded in intellectual property markets. Lerner, Sorensen, and Stromberg (2011) 
state that the use of patents as a measure of innovative activity is widely accepted in the 
literature. Alternatively, we could use R&D capital to proxy for innovation, with R&D 
capital being the sum of unamortized past R&D expenditures. However, R&D 
expenditures from several years before the IPO are unlikely to be observable for most 
IPOs.2 Patent grants are readily available from the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO)’s website, regardless of whether a company is private or public. 
We find that patents strongly and positively predict the long-run performance of 
VC-backed IPOs. Within the class of VC-backed IPOs, firms with pre-IPO patents 
granted substantially outperform various benchmarks, whereas those without patents do 
not. The outperformance is both economically and statistically strong. The Fama-French 
3-factor model alphas for value-weighted calendar-time portfolios are 74 basis points per 
month for VC-backed IPOs with patents versus 31 basis points per month for those 
without patents. The average 3-year market-adjusted buy-and-hold return is -7.1% for 
VC-backed IPOs with patents, versus -23.3% for those without patents (and -24.2% for 
                                                             
2 For example, R&D expenses from fiscal years 3 to 7 years before the IPO are needed to calculate R&D 
capital in the innovation efficiency measure of Hirshleifer, Hsu and Li (2012). Most young firm IPOs, 
however, do not report audited financial statements from fiscal years that are more than 3 years old.  
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non-VC-backed IPOs). Moreover, patents also positively predict the long-run price 
performance of non-VC-backed IPOs, as reported in Panels D and E of Table 4.  
Patents are more important for large than small VC-backed firms, i.e, the value-
weighted results are stronger than the equally weighted results. Among VC-backed firms 
with patents, those having low citations show even stronger outperformance than others. 
Moreover, when we include the R&D ability factor of Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2013) 
in multifactor regressions, our findings remain qualitatively unchanged. This result 
indicates that VC-backed IPOs with patents outperform, other IPOs don’t, and this 
pattern is not likely to be driven by the more general relation between R&D and stock 
returns.  
This paper adds to an extensive literature documenting cross-sectional patterns in 
the long-run performance of IPOs.3 Brav and Gompers (1997) find that VC-backed IPOs 
do not underperform the market or comparable firms. Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) 
show that IPOs with high-prestige underwriters do not underperform. Teoh, Welch, and 
Wong (1998) report that IPOs with low discretionary accruals do not underperform. Chan 
et. al. (2008) examine discretionary accruals, VC-backing, and underwriter prestige, and 
report results confirming the findings of the original authors. Krishnan, Ivanov, Masulis, 
and Singh (2011) report that the long-run returns on VC-backed IPOs from 1996-2002 
are positively related to the reputation of the VC firms, as measured by the prior market 
share of IPOs that a VC firm has conducted. Cao and Lerner (2009) find that buyout-
backed IPOs do not underperform the market on average. Ritter (2011) reports that 
                                                             
3  Ritter (1991), Lerner (1994), Loughran and Ritter (1995, 2000), Baker and Wurgler (2000), and 
Hirshleifer (2001) discuss a behavioral explanation for poor performance subsequent to equity offerings. 
They argue that stock prices periodically diverge from fundamental values, and that managers and 
investment bankers take advantage of overpricing by selling stock to overly optimistic investors.    
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issuers with pre-IPO annual sales of more than $50 million do not reliably underperform 
the market, whereas smaller issuers have average 3-year buy-and-hold market-adjusted 
returns of -35.2%. Brau, Couch, and Sutton (2012) show that IPOs without acquisition 
activity within a year of going public do not underperform. We show that our results are 
robust to the inclusion of many of these predictors, suggesting that patent possession is a 
new and previously undetected predictor for the cross-section of the long-run 
performance of IPOs. 
In addition to analyzing the effect of patents on the long-run performance of IPOs, 
we also document an important pattern related to VC-backed IPOs. Specifically, the 
superior performance of VC-backed IPOs relative to other IPOs, first documented by 
Brav and Gompers (1997), has reversed during the 1999-2000 bubble period and later. 
For 1981-1998, VC-backed IPOs have produced average 3-year buy-and-hold market-
adjusted returns of -10.7%, versus -28.7% for non-VC-backed IPOs. In contrast, for 
1999-2006, VC-backed IPOs have underperformed the market by -36.2% over three 
years, versus -2.8% for non-VC-backed IPOs.  
This paper contributes to the growing literature on how investors fail to fully 
incorporate relevant public information about innovations.4 The future cash flows from 
innovation can be long deferred, highly uncertain, and difficult to project. Hall (1993) 
and Hall and Hall (1993) suggest that investors therefore might be myopic in pricing the 
future cash flows from innovations, leading to undervaluation. Huberman and Regev 
(2001) and Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li (2012) show that investors with limited attention may 
                                                             
4  Previous studies identify many innovation measures with predictive power for future stock returns, 
including the R&D capital to market value ratio (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Chan, Lakonishok, and 
Sougiannis, 2001; Guo, Lev, and Shi, 2006; Li, 2011), R&D growth (Eberhart, Maxwell, and Siddique, 
2004; Lev, Sarath, and Sougiannis, 2005; Hsu, 2009), patents and citations (Deng, Lev, and Narin, 1999; 
Gu, 2005; Hsu, 2009), innovation efficiency (Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li, 2013), and innovation ability (Cohen, 
Diether, and Malloy, 2013).   
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fail to reflect innovation information into stock prices, leading to undervaluation.5 Cohen, 
Diether, and Malloy (2013) document that investors do not correctly price the innovation 
ability of firms in translating R&D into future sales, and a long-short portfolio strategy 
based on the past track records of innovation ability earns abnormal returns of roughly 11% 
per year. Most of the existing research, however, focuses on mature public firms and does 
not separately examine the entrepreneurial young startup and high-growth firms that 
characterize VC-backed IPO firms. We posit that VC-backed IPOs with patents are 
undervalued, whereas VC-backed IPO firms without patents are overvalued at the time of 
the IPO. An alternative interpretation is that investors are overoptimistic about the 
prospects of firms that have not demonstrated an ability to convert R&D expenditures 
into patentable products. If either interpretation is correct, the initial misvaluation should 
manifest itself in long-run abnormal returns.  
 
2. Data, Sample and Methods 
We collect returns on common stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), American Stock Exchange (Amex), and NASDAQ from CRSP, and accounting 
data of the issuing firms from COMPUSTAT. We obtain the IPO date, offer price, and 
underpricing from the Thomson-Reuters Securities Data Company (SDC) new issues 
database from 1981 to 2006, with numerous fill-ins of missing data and corrections based 
upon information from Dealogic for 1990-2006, the Graham Howard-Todd Huxster set of 
IPO prospectuses from 1975-1996 given to Jay Ritter, EDGAR for 1996-2006, and other 
sources. We exclude closed-end funds, Real Estate Investment Trusts, banks and S&Ls, 
                                                             
5 Merton (1987), Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), Peng and Xiong (2006), DellaVigna and Pollet (2009), and 
Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009), among others, analyze how limited investor attention affects stock 
prices and can cause market underreaction.   
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American Depository Receipts, unit offerings, limited partnerships, and IPOs with 
proceeds below $1.5 million, an offer price of under $5 per share, or companies not listed 
on CRSP within six months of the IPO date.  
An IPO is classified as venture capital-backed based upon venture funding 
information from Thomson-Reuters VentureXpert database, with numerous alterations 
based upon inspection of the prospectuses. The VentureXpert database provides 
information on buyout and venture capital firms and their investments, but it does not 
differentiate between venture capital financing and growth capital financing. We classify 
318 growth capital-backed IPOs from 1981-2006, which comprise about 10% of what the 
VentureXpert database classifies as VC-backed IPOs, as non-VC-backed IPOs. The main 
criteria for classifying an IPO with a financial sponsor as growth capital-backed rather 
than venture capital-backed is whether the company is investing in tangible assets and/or 
growing primarily through acquisitions, in which case we classify the IPO as growth 
capital-backed.6 The classification procedure leaves us with a final sample of 2,254 VC-
backed IPOs and 4,568 non-VC-backed IPOs from 1981-2006. 
A VC-backed IPO is classified as possessing a patent if it has at least one patent 
granted before the IPO date; otherwise, it is classified as without patents. We retrieve the 
patent grants information from the latest version of the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER) patent database that was initially created by Hall, Jaffe, and 
Trajtenberg (2001). The NBER patent database provides detailed information on more 
than three million patents that were granted by the United States Patent and Trademark 
                                                             
6 See Ritter (2014) for further details. A list of companies that we identify as growth capital-backed can be 
found on his website. Most growth capital-backed IPOs are in industries such as health care services, 
restaurants, retailing, airlines, and garbage collection, for which patents are unimportant. Very few are in 
technology industries, and none are in biotech. 
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Office (USPTO) from January 1, 1976 to December 31, 2006. The database provides 
detailed information on patent assignee (owner) names, the number of patents, the 
number of citations received by each patent, a patent’s application year, a patent’s grant 
date, and a patent’s 3-digit technology class, etc.  
We match the NBER patent database to VC-backed companies using GVKEY and 
CUSIP identifiers. Following the innovation literature, we set the number of patents to 
zero for companies that have no patent information available from the NBER patent 
database. While patents protection starts from the application dates and innovation begins 
once they appear (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001), it takes on average two years for a 
patent to be granted by USPTO. To avoid the look-ahead bias due to patent application-
grant lag, following Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li (2013), we hence date all patents by their 
grant date instead of application date. In robustness tests, we use the year of the patent 
filing and assume at least a two year lag prior to the grant date and find qualitatively 
consistent results, which are available in the Appendix Table A2. 
In Table A1 of the Appendix that accompanies this paper, we report patent 
information from both the NBER patent database and the IPO prospectus for some 
example firms (all table numbers with an “A” prefix appear in the Appendix). The 
comparison shows that, although the NBER patent database summarizes the patent 
information quite well on average, the correlation with what is reported in IPO 
prospectuses is far from perfect. This is one reason why we use a simple 0-1 
classification scheme.7   
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
                                                             
7 One reason for a correlation of less than 1.0 is that a firm may have recently acquired another firm that 
had patent applications, but the NBER dataset would list them under the acquired company’s name. 
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Table 1 presents the distribution of the sample by year. The table reports, by year, 
the number of VC-backed IPOs and the total number of successful patent grants over the 
five calendar years either prior to, or after, the IPO year by these newly listed companies. 
The last column shows, by year, the number of VC-backed IPOs that have at least one 
patent grant prior to the IPO date.  
This table highlights the increase in VC-backed IPO activities in the 1990s. The 
number of VC-backed firms going public hit a peak in 1999 and 2000 during the tech 
bubble. The time series suggest that VCs are more likely to take portfolio companies 
public when public market valuations are high, consistent with Lerner (1994). There is a 
strong pattern of persistence in innovation: pre-IPO patent grants have a correlation 
coefficient of 0.73 with post-IPO patent grants. The results indicate that VC-backed 
companies that have patents before the IPO will continue to file patents and maintain 
innovation after the IPO.8 Table 1 does not report patent grants over event years +1 to +5 
for IPOs from 2002 to 2006 due to the increasing missing observation problem (i.e., the 
NBER patent database only contains data for patents granted before the end of 2006).  
The NBER patent database does not contain information about patents that were 
subsequently denied. Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) show that it takes about two 
years after the filing to grant a patent. For successful patents filed in calendar year t 
during the late 1990s, about 85% are granted by the end of calendar year t+2 after the 
filing year, and about 95% by the end of calendar year t+3. We hence focus on patents 
that have been successfully granted before the IPO, which are always publicly known 
before the IPO, to avoid the look-ahead bias associated with patent applications that are 
                                                             
8 Bernstein (2012) and Ferreira, Manso, and Silva (2014) provide evidence on the impact of going public 
on firms’ innovation activities.   
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ultimately successful. 
 [Insert Figure 1 Here] 
Figure 1 shows the average number of new subsequently successful patent filings 
and patent grants per firm per event year over the 11 event years centered on the calendar 
year of the IPO. The solid line depicts the yearly average number of new patent filings; 
and the dashed line shows the yearly average number of new patent grants. 
According to the solid line of Figure 1, perhaps not surprisingly, we observe a steep 
uptrend in the average number of successful patent filings per firm per event year. On 
average, in event year -3 there are 0.6 new subsequently successful patent filings, and in 
year +3 there are 2.3 new successful patent filings for the surviving firms, with the (not 
shown) cumulative number rising to about 16 by the end of event year +5. The dashed 
line indicates a similar uptrend for the average number of patent grants, with an average 
of 0.3 and 1.6 in event years -3 and +3, respectively. Patents are counted until the end of 
calendar year 2006 due to the data availability of the NBER patent database. 9  In 
unreported results, we observe a similar, but much steeper, uptrend for the subset of 594 
VC-backed IPOs that have at least one patent grant before the IPO.  
 
3. Patents and VC-backed IPOs Performance 
A.  Firm Characteristics and Accounting Performance  
In Table 2, we summarize the firm characteristics and accounting performance for 
the VC-backed IPOs with and without patents. Table 2 reports the sample means of 
                                                             
9 When a firm is acquired/merged/spun-off, the NBER patent database assigns its patents to the new owner. 
At present it does not track ownership changes when patents are sold independently of their initial assigned 
owners.   
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variables computed for the fiscal year in which the IPO occurred, and one, two, three, 
four, and five years after the IPO.10 2,198 of the 2,254 VC-backed issuing firms have 
financial information in COMPUSTAT for the fiscal year in which the IPO occurred, with 
the sample size falling to 1,270 five years after the IPO due to delistings. All variables 
using levels rather than flows are computed using data at the end of the fiscal year, as 
reported by COMPUSTAT.  
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
Surprisingly, Table 2 shows that the mean market value of VC-backed IPOs without 
patents falls during fiscal year +1 after the IPO. This drop is largely due to the large 
number of highly valued VC-backed IPOs during 1999-2000 that collapsed in price after 
March 2000. Table 2 shows that VC-backed IPOs with patents have mean R&D-to-assets 
and R&D-to-sales ratios about 40% higher than VC-backed firms without patents.11 The 
patterns in Table 2 show a downtrend in the R&D-to-sales ratio from the IPO year to five 
years after the IPO, while the R&D-to-assets ratio is relatively stable. The mean R&D-to-
sales ratio of 0.55 to 0.97 in various years is high because many biotech firms have ratios 
far above 1.00. In unreported results, we find that the median R&D-to-sales ratio is about 
0.21 for VC-backed IPOs with patents and about 0.14 for those VC-backed IPOs without 
patents in the IPO year. Those with patents have smaller CAPEX/assets than those 
without at the IPO year and one year after, then they share similar levels afterwards. 
Consistent with Chemmanur, Simonyan, and Tehranian (2013), VC-backed IPOs with or 
                                                             
10 We Winsorize all variables at the 1% and 99% percentiles to eliminate outliers, and set missing values to 
zero before calculating the means.  
11 The higher average R&D-to-sales ratio relative to the R&D-to-assets ratio is partly due to the low 
revenue of most biotech stocks in the IPO year and subsequent years. For example, for the VC-backed 
biotech IPOs with patents, the average sales in the IPO year is only $35 million, and the median sales is 
even smaller ($6 million), generating a high average R&D-to-sales ratio of 1.90. We observe the same 
pattern for VC-backed biotech IPOs without patents, too.  
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without patents both have negative profitability on average after the IPO, whether 
measured in terms of operating income-to-assets or net income-to-assets (ROA).12  
B. Underpricing 
An extensive literature on IPOs finds sizeable positive average returns on the first 
day of trading. Megginson and Weiss (1991) show that U.S. VC-backed IPOs have lower 
first-day returns than non-VC-backed IPOs during 1983 through 1987, which they 
attribute to the VC certification role in reducing information asymmetry between 
investors and issuing firms. Evidence from recent years suggests that U.S. VC-backed 
IPOs are more underpriced than other IPOs. Liu and Ritter (2011) report that during 
1993-2008 VC-backed IPOs with subsequent coverage from an all-star analyst affiliated 
with a lead underwriter are underpriced by 21% more (e.g., 31% vs. 10%) than non-VC-
backed IPOs, but other VC-backed IPOs are not reliably underpriced more or less than 
non-VC-backed IPOs.13 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
Table 3 reports the summary statistics of the first-day returns for the VC-backed 
IPOs with and without patents. The average first-day return for those without patents 
during the period January 1981 to December 2006 is 32.0%, a level slightly higher than 
the 25.2% for VC-backed IPOs with patents. The September 1998 to June 2000 internet 
bubble had a striking effect on first day returns for both VC-backed IPOs with or without 
patents, which reached average levels of 92.3% and 95.6%, respectively, during this 
                                                             
12 Appendix Table A3 summarizes the characteristics and accounting performance for the VC-backed IPOs 
with and without patents sorted on size or book-to-market ratio. VC-backed IPOs in large size or value 
terciles (high book-to-market ratio) have better profitability than those in small size or growth terciles (low 
book-to-market ratio).   
13 Liu and Ritter (2011, column 1 of Table 5) report a coefficient of 2.88 on a VC dummy and 18.03 on an 
interaction of a VC dummy and an all-star analyst dummy, giving a total effect of 20.91% in an 
underpricing regression. 
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bubble period. In general, there is little difference in the distribution of first-day returns 
between the two categories of VC-based IPOs. 
C. Firm Level Stock Performance 
Brav and Gompers (1997) find that equally weighted portfolios of VC-backed IPOs 
from 1975-1992 outperform non-VC-backed IPOs during the three years after issuing. In 
this section, we present firm level analyses of long-run performance of VC-backed IPOs 
with and without patents from 1981-2006. Later on, we will show that the results are 
qualitatively similar when weighting each time period equally, rather than each IPO 
equally. 
In examining IPO long-run performance, we employ various performance measures 
that have been used in the literature. These measures include buy-and-hold returns (raw 
and market-adjusted returns), monthly returns (raw and market-adjusted), Fama-French 
(1993) 3-factor alphas, and Fama-French (2014) 5-factor alphas.14 If the sample firm gets 
delisted, the performance measures are calculated up to the delisting date. 
The average buy-and-hold raw returns and monthly raw returns are computed on the 
basis of monthly stock returns over 24, 36, 48, and 60 calendar months starting from the 
closing price on the last trading day of the IPO month, and do not include the first-day 
return or returns until the end of the IPO calendar month. The average buy-and-hold 
market-adjusted returns and monthly market-adjusted returns are adjusted by subtracting 
the compound return on the CRSP value-weighted NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq index. All 
returns include capital gains and dividends. 
                                                             
14 The Fama-French factor portfolios are themselves partly composed of new issues, and the small size, 
high growth, low profitability, and high investment portfolios may have a high proportion of recent IPOs, 
so there is a “factor contamination” problem that biases the estimated intercept towards zero, as discussed 
in Loughran and Ritter (2000).   
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In calculating Fama-French 3-factor alphas, for each firm we regress monthly firm 
excess returns on the Fama and French three factors for 24, 36, 48, and 60 months after 
the IPO,  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖�𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡� + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡. 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 is the return on stock 𝑖 in excess of the risk-free interest rate (the one-
month Treasury bill rate) at time t; 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 is the value-weighted market return of all 
NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq firms minus the risk-free rate at time t; 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  is the difference 
between the return on small- and big-capitalization firms; and 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  is the difference  
between the return on high and low book-to-market stocks, with the factor returns 
downloaded from Ken French’s website.  
We calculate Fama-French 5-factor alphas by regressing the excess returns on the 
Fama-French five factors, which include the Fama-French three factors plus the 
profitability factor and the investment factor,  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖�𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡� + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑚𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝑛𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡, 
where the profitability factor 𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡, is the difference between the return on robust and 
weak operating profitability firms; and the investment factor 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 , is the difference 
between the return on conservative and aggressive investment firms, both of which help 
to explain the stock returns of IPO firms (Lyandres, Sun and Zhang, 2008; Hou, Xue, and 
Zhang, 2014; Fama and French, 2014). If a sample firm gets delisted, the IPO returns and 
the corresponding benchmark returns are calculated using data up to the delisting date. 
When available, we include the firm's delisting return. 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
Panels A and B of Table 4 summarize the equally weighted average long-run raw 
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and abnormal returns in the five years following the IPOs of 1,660 VC-backed IPOs 
without patents and 594 VC-backed IPOs with patents, respectively. In Panel A, VC-
backed IPOs without patents deliver an average raw buy-and-hold return of 12.1% over 
three years, and perform similarly to the non-VC-backed IPOs in Panel C of Table 4.15 In 
contrast, Panel B shows that VC-backed IPOs with patents deliver a substantially higher 
average raw buy-and-hold return of 28.2% over three years. When the buy-and-hold 
return is adjusted by the compounded value-weighted market return, the outperformance 
of VC-backed IPOs with patents relative to those without patents is 16.2% (-23.3% vs. -
7.1%) after three years, in terms of average buy-and-hold market-adjusted returns.  
Moreover, all of the average monthly Fama-French 3-factor alphas of VC-backed 
IPOs without patents are negative in the five years after the IPO, ranging from a monthly 
average of -0.38% in the first year to a monthly average of -0.17% in the first five years, 
in Panel A. By comparison, Panel B shows that all of the average monthly Fama-French 
alphas of VC-backed IPOs with patents are positive, ranging from 0.21% to 0.52%, 
including an average of 0.47% per month in the first five years. Therefore, VC-backed 
IPOs with patents substantially outperform those without patents by 0.64% per month (-
0.17% vs. +0.47%) in the five years after the IPO in terms of Fama-French 3-factor 
alphas when each IPO is weighted equally. The Fama-French 5-factor alphas, which 
control for the Fama-French three factors plus the profitability and investment factors, 
also show that VC-backed IPOs with patents outperform those without patents, by 0.51% 
per month in their first five years after the IPO. When average monthly market-adjusted 
returns are used, the results are similar.  
                                                             
15 If a stock is delisted before the end of a T-month buy-and-hold return period, the return is calculated up 
until the delisting date. The sample size for the 60-month buy-and-hold returns is thus just as large as for 
the 24-month buy-and-hold returns. 
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Panel C of Table 4 reports the equally weighted average long-run performance of 
4,568 non-VC-backed IPOs in the five years after the IPO. Panel C shows that, consistent 
with the literature, non-VC-backed IPOs underperform. The average buy-and-hold 
market-adjusted return is -16.1% two years after the IPO, and increases to -35.5% five 
years after the IPO. In addition, all the average monthly Fama-French 3-factor alphas of 
non-VC-backed IPOs are negative, ranging from -0.43% to -0.49%. The average monthly 
Fama-French 5-factor alphas also show underperformance, ranging from -0.06% to -
0.23%, although the point estimates are close to zero.16  
In Panels D and E of Table 4, we show that patents also have a positive effect on the 
long-run price performance of non-VC-backed IPOs, though the economic scales are 
smaller. Among the 4,568 non-VC-backed IPOs, 561 of them are classified as having at 
least one patent grant before the IPO; while the other 4,007 issuers are classified as non-
VC-backed IPOs without patents.17 Those IPOs with patents outperform those without 
patents by 13.8% (-26.1% vs. -12.3%) in terms of average 3-year buy-and-hold market-
adjusted returns, and 0.70% per month (-0.50% vs. +0.20%) in terms of Fama-French 3-
factor alphas in the three years after the IPO when each IPO is weighted equally. 
Finally, in Panels F of Table 4, we report the long-run performance of 6,822 IPO 
firms. They deliver an average raw buy-and-hold return of 14.1% to 34.0% over the two 
to five years after the IPOs. Consistent with Ritter and Welch (2002), the IPOs 
                                                             
16 Our results are robust to alternative classifications of VC-backed IPOs with and without patents. For 
example, we find similar patterns in Appendix Table A2, where we date patents by application year and an 
issuing firm is classified as with patents if it has at least one successful patent filing up to event year -3 
prior to the IPO year. The three year lag is utilized to account for the patent application-grant lag.  
17 It is somewhat surprising that only 561 out of 4,568 non-VC-backed IPOs have patents, given that over 
1,000 are spinoffs or buyout-backed. Partly, the low count reflects the fact that the NBER database does not 
include patents from before 1976, and also because of name changes associated with mergers and spinoffs. 
Because the NBER patent dataset does not adjust for name changes or sales of patents, we have 
undoubtedly undercounted the number of IPOs with patents. 
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substantially underperform the market. For example, they suffer large negative buy-and-
hold market-adjusted returns of -22.7% and negative average monthly market-adjusted 
return of -0.64% in the three years after the IPO. After we control for the well-known size 
and value effects, the IPOs still underperform and have a negative average monthly 
Fama-French 3-factor alpha of -0.30%. However, the negative long-run abnormal returns  
of IPOs are largely explained when investment and profitability factors are added. The 
IPOs actually generate a slightly positive average monthly Fama-French 5-factor alpha of 
0.07% in the three years after the IPO.  
These findings are consistent with Bessembinder and Zhang (2013), who show that 
the long-run returns of IPOs can be explained by controlling for firm characteristics such 
as idiosyncratic volatility, prior returns, and illiquidity in addition to size and book-to-
market. It should be noted, however, that the alphas are biased towards zero due to the 
“factor contamination” problem discussed in Loughran and Ritter (2000). Specifically, 
because in some periods many recent IPOs are in the small firm portfolio of SMB, the 
growth firm portfolio of HML, the high investment firm portfolio of CMA, and the 
unprofitable firm portfolio of RMW, low returns on IPOs are affecting the factor returns. 
In summary, the overall evidence from Table 4 suggests that VC-backed IPOs with 
patents strongly outperform VC-backed IPOs without patents and non-VC-backed IPOs 
for almost all performance measures. However, VC-backed IPOs without patents perform 
similarly to non-VC-backed IPOs, and both underperform the market. Patents also have a 
positive effect on non-VC-backed IPOs but with smaller economic magnitude: those with 
patents outperform those without patents, but underperform VC-backed IPOs with 
patents generally. Although the firm characteristics such as investment and operating 
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profitability help to explain the long-run underperformance of IPOs in general, they 
cannot explain the outperformance of VC-backed IPOs with patents. 
Patents are important for high-tech firms while they may not be equally important in 
non-high-tech sectors. We thus classify all VC-backed IPOs into non-high-tech, high-tech, 
and biotech groups according to standard industry classification (SIC) codes at the IPO.18 
The average three-year long-run performance results of non-high-tech, high-tech, and 
biotech industries after the IPO are reported in Table 5. Panel A of Table 5 reports the 
results for VC-backed IPOs without patents, while Panel B reports the results for those 
VC-backed IPOs with patents. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
Table 5 shows that the innovation leads to outperformance in all three sectors, 
especially in the high-tech sector, no matter what performance measure is used. For 
example, using 3-year market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns, the VC-backed IPOs with 
patents outperform those without patents by 5.2%, 26.1%, and 13.8% for  non-high-tech, 
high-tech, and biotech firms, respectively. 
D. Subperiod Firm Level Performance 
This subsection refines the firm level stock price performance results reported in the 
previous section by assessing the 3-year long-run performance of VC-backed IPOs with 
and without patents in different subsample periods and cohort years. This analysis is 
motivated by the evidence that IPO long-run performance varies across time. Loughran 
and Ritter (2000), among others, find that IPO performance is particularly poor following 
                                                             
18 An IPO’s industry is determined by its primary 3-digit SIC code at the IPO. High-tech industries are 
classiﬁed as belonging to SIC codes 481 (telecommunications), 365-369 (electronic equipment), 482-489 
(communication services), 357 (computer hardware), and 737 (computer software). Biotech industries are 
defined as those belonging to SIC codes 283 and 874 (biological products, genetics, pharmaceuticals, and 
biological research). All other industries are non-high-tech. 
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hot IPO markets.  
Table 6 reports the average firm level three-year stock performance measures for 
IPOs from four subperiods: 1981-1989, 1990-1998, 1999-2000, and 2001-2006. Panels A 
and B of Table 6 report the subperiod results for 1,660 and 594 VC-backed IPOs without 
and with patents, respectively, based on at least one patent grant before the IPO. Panel C 
reports the subperiod results for all 2,254 VC-backed IPOs. Panel D reports the subperiod 
results for 4,568 non-VC-backed IPOs.  
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
Consistent with the literature, the long-run abnormal performance of IPOs varies 
over time. Panels A and B show that, among VC-backed IPOs, firms with patents 
strongly outperform firms without patents during all but the 2001-2006 periods. VC-
backed IPOs with patents generate sizable positive Fama-French 3-factor alphas and 
Fama-French 5-factor alphas across every subperiod except for IPOs from 2001-2006.  
Brav and Gompers (1997) show that VC-backed IPOs from 1975-1992 outperform 
non-VC-backed IPOs, and that VC-backed IPOs do not significantly underperform size- 
and book-to-market-matched benchmarks, although both categories underperform 
relative to the market. Consistent with their findings, taking an IPO-weighted average of 
the 1981-1989 and 1990-1998 numbers, the average market-adjusted 3-year buy-and-hold 
return is -10.8% for VC-backed IPOs in Panel C and -28.7% for non-VC-backed IPOs in 
Panel D. However, the weighted average market-adjusted 3-year buy-and-hold return for 
the VC-backed IPOs from 1999-2006 is -36.2% in Panel C; in Panel D, the average 3-
year buy-and-hold market-adjusted return for the non-VC-backed IPOs from 1999-2006 
is -2.7%. Thus, for 1999-2006, VC-backed IPOs have underperformed non-VC-backed 
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IPOs when 3-year buy-and-hold market-adjusted returns are used, although the reversal is 
not strong when 3-factor or 5-factor regression alphas are used as a measure of 
performance. 19  In other words, the pattern that Brav and Gompers documented has 
reversed for IPOs from 1999-2006. 
Table 7 presents average 3-year buy-and-hold returns for VC-backed IPOs with and 
without patents over each cohort year, with the returns starting from the closing price on 
the last trading day of the calendar month of the IPO. For every VC-backed IPO, we 
calculate the 36-month buy-and-hold return and the compounded market benchmark 
return, and report the average (equal-weighted in Panel A and market capitalization-
weighted in Panel B) returns for the cohort year. If a sample firm gets delisted, the IPO 
returns and the corresponding benchmark returns are calculated using data up to the 
delisting date. Also reported is the wealth relative, calculated as 
𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 = ��1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑇�/��1 + 𝑅𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ 𝑖,𝑇�, 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑇  is the buy-and-hold return on IPO i for holding period of length T and 
𝑅𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ 𝑖,𝑇 is the benchmark buy-and-hold return on the value-weighted market portfolio 
of all NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq firms over the same period. Wealth relatives as a measure of 
performance were first introduced by Ritter (1991), and are identical to public market 
equivalents when the benchmark return is the market return, as in Kaplan and Schoar 
(2005). 
                                                             
19 For VC-backed IPOs from 1999-2000, Panel B of Table 6 reports an average monthly 3-factor alpha of 
+1.42% for 105 VC-backed IPOs with patents, while at the same time reporting an average 3-year buy-and-
hold market-adjusted return of -25.4%. The reason for the difference in abnormal performance is that the 
multifactor model estimates a high factor loading (slope coefficient) on the market factor and a very 
negative factor loading on the book-to-market factor. During the March 2000 to March 2003 period, the 
market excess return was strongly negative and the HML factor return was strongly positive. Ritter and 
Welch (2002, Table V) report a similar difference in the abnormal returns for the bubble period IPOs using 
these alternative benchmarks. 
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[Insert Table 7 Here] 
Table 7 shows that the average 3-year buy-and-hold returns and wealth relatives 
have large variations over time. These results are largely consistent with the results in 
Ritter and Welch (2002). Nevertheless, VC-backed IPOs with patents substantially 
outperform those VC-backed IPOs without patents. In Panel A of Table 7, when 
weighting each VC-backed IPO equally, the average 3-year wealth relative for the 594 
with patents is 0.95, versus only 0.83 for the 1,660 without. In Panel B of Table 7, we 
weight each IPO employing inflation-adjusted market values for each cohort year, and 
find that those with patents show significantly better performance, with an average 
wealth relative of 1.14, in contrast to only 0.64 for those without patents.   
E. Calendar-time Portfolio Performance  
The firm level performance measures in event time suffer from cross-sectional 
correlation, which is why we have not reported statistical significance measures in Tables 
1-7. In this subsection, we report calendar-time long-run performance of VC-backed IPOs 
with and without patents, weighting each time period equally rather than weighting each 
IPO equally.20 We form monthly portfolios of VC-backed IPOs with and without patents 
by including all issues that were undertaken in the three years previous to the month of 
the observation. We then calculate the monthly excess returns, defined as monthly returns 
of the equal- or value-weighted return of these portfolios less the risk-free rate (the one-
month Treasury bill rate). The calendar-time portfolios are rebalanced every month, and 
the value weights are based on the previous month’s month-end market values of the 
issuing firms.  
                                                             
20  A disadvantage of the calendar-time approach is that it tends to underestimate the level of 
underperformance when the magnitude of abnormal underperformance is positively correlated with issuing 
activity (Loughran and Ritter, 2000).  
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[Insert Table 8 Here] 
Panel A of Table 8 reports Fama-French 3-factor time-series regression results for 
calendar-time portfolios of VC-backed IPOs with and without patents for the 347 months 
from February 1981 to December 2009. Unless there is an early delisting, an IPO is 
included in a portfolio for the 36 calendar months after listing. The equally weighted 
calendar-time portfolio of VC-backed IPOs with patents significantly outperforms; the 
alpha is 0.52% per month, which is economically sizable and statistically significant, 
with a t-statistic of 2.18. When those with patents are value-weighted, the outperformance 
is even stronger, with a monthly Fama-French alpha of 0.74%, and a t-statistic of 2.15. 
Abnormal returns of 0.74% per month correspond to approximately 9% per year.  
By comparison, for both the equally and value-weighted calendar-time portfolios of 
VC-backed IPOs without patents, the Fama-French 3-factor alphas are insignificantly 
different from zero, suggesting that those without patents in general perform as well as 
other firms with similar characteristics. As a benchmark, the last two columns of Table 8 
show that both the equally and value weighted portfolios of non-VC-backed IPOs 
significantly underperform, with a monthly Fama-French alpha of -0.41% and -0.19%, 
respectively. Table 8 weights each calendar month equally, whereas the average alphas 
reported in Table 4 weight each IPO equally. Nevertheless, a comparison of the Fama-
French alphas in the two tables leads to similar conclusions.  
Next, we examine whether the outperformance of VC-backed IPOs with patents is 
captured by existing innovation-related effects in the cross-section of mature public firms. 
Specifically, we augment the Fama-French 3-factor model with the innovation ability 
factor (IAH) of Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2013), who document that the innovation 
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ability of firms in translating R&D into future sales growth is a positive predictor for the 
cross-section of stock returns. The IAH factor is the return difference between a portfolio 
of stocks with high R&D and high innovation ability and a portfolio of stocks with high 
R&D and low innovation ability.   
Panel B of Table 8 shows that our findings generally remain unchanged by the 
inclusion of the innovation ability factor. All the factor loadings on the innovation factor 
are economically small (less than 0.05 in absolute value). The inclusion of the innovation 
factor has little impact on the abnormal returns of VC-backed IPOs. For example, the 
value-weighted portfolio of innovation VC-backed IPOs still generates abnormal return 
of 0.71% per month, with a t-statistic of 2.03. We thus conclude that our findings are 
distinct from existing innovation-related patterns in the literature such as those reported 
in Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2013) and Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li (2013).21  
In summary, the empirical evidence heretofore indicates that investors fail to fully 
incorporate the value-relevant information of patents and innovation at the point of the 
IPO, resulting in underreaction and return predictability. Furthermore, this predictability 
remains even after controlling for a more general innovation ability factor. 
In the Appendix Table A4, we study the effects of patent citations on the predictive 
power of innovation, and classify the 594 VC-backed IPOs with patents into low and 
high citations groups based on cumulative citations received prior to the IPO.22 Patent 
citations reflect the technology or economic significance of patents (e.g., Trajtenberg, 
1990). Financial analysts, media and investors also pay a lot of attention to high impact 
                                                             
21 In unreported results, we find that our findings are robust to the inclusion of additional factors such as a 
momentum factor or an investment factor.   
22 We collect each patent's pre-IPO citation data manually, because the number of citations received by each 
patent in the NBER patent database is counted until the end of 2006, which subjects the cumulative counts 
to a look-ahead bias for IPOs from before 2007. 
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inventions. High-citations patents hence are more salient and less uncertain to investors. 
The psychology literature shows that, due to the limited attention, investors will 
underreact more to information that is less salient and with higher uncertainty (see 
Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li (2013) and the references therein), indicating that the positive 
predictive ability of innovation will be stronger for those low-citation patents.  
Table A4 shows that, while both low and high citations portfolios of VC-backed 
IPOs with patents have positive abnormal returns, the low citations portfolio performs 
much better. For example, the monthly Fama-French alpha is 1.09% for the value-
weighted low citations portfolio, while it is only -0.05% for the corresponding high 
citations portfolio. The evidence suggests that investors underestimate the economic 
importance of patents, and especially those patents that have not generated many citations 
at the time of going public. These findings are consistent with our premise that patents 
with low citations are less salient and more uncertain, so that they are more likely to be 
ignored by the market.   
Size and the book-to-market ratio are important firm characteristics related to long-
run performance. In a further robustness check, Table A5 reports the performance of 
calendar-time portfolios of VC-backed IPOs formed on the basis of market capitalization 
and the book-to-market ratio, following Brav and Gompers (1997). Table A5 shows that 
the alphas are highest for the portfolios of larger companies and value companies, and 
VC-backed IPOs with patents consistently outperform those without patents across all 
three size and book-to-market groups. For example, the Fama-French alphas of the value-
weighted portfolios of VC-backed IPOs with patents are as high as 0.96% and 2.13% per 
month for the large size and value groups, respectively.  
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4. Cross-sectional differences across VC-backed IPOs 
In this section, we employ multivariate cross-sectional regressions to further assess 
the positive effect of patents on VC-backed IPOs’ long-run performance in the three years 
after going public. Table 9 reports the regression results for the sample of 2,254 VC-
backed IPOs from 1981 to 2006. The dependent variables for Columns (1) to (3) in Table 
9 are the monthly Fama-French 3-factor alphas estimated by running firm-specific time-
series regressions of monthly firm excess returns on the Fama and French factors for 36 
months after the IPO. The dependent variables for Columns (4) to (6) are the 3-year buy-
and-hold market-adjusted returns. 
The variable of interest is the patent dummy, which is equal to one when the firm 
has at least one patent grant before the IPO, and zero otherwise. The sample size falls to 
2,042 when we include various alternative determinants of IPO return performance such 
as the logarithm of inflation-adjusted sales (in millions of dollars of 2006 purchase 
power), book-to-market equity ratio (BE/ME), debt-to-total assets ratio, cash-to-sales 
ratio, research and development (R&D) expenses-to-sales ratio, patent grants at the IPO 
year relative to R&D expenditures ratio, underpricing, logarithm of IPO firm age at the 
IPO, and underwriter reputation (measured on a 0 to 9 scale, with 9 high).23 All the 
accounting variables are computed using data at the end of the fiscal year of the IPO in 
COMPUSTAT. Variables are Winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels, and the 5% and 99% 
                                                             
23 The book-to-market equity ratio is calculated as the book value of equity divided by the market value 
of common equity at the end of the fiscal year of the IPO, which would bias the BE/ME coefficient 
downwards. To avoid losing firm-year observations when calculating ratios with a zero in the denominator, 
we add a small positive number to the actual values of sales and R&D expenditures when their values are 
equal to zero. Following Field and Karpoff (2002) and Loughran and Ritter (2004), IPO firm age is defined 
as the calendar year of offering minus the calendar year of founding. The IPO founding dates and updated 
Carter and Manaster (1990) underwriter reputation rankings are available from Jay Ritter’s website. 
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levels for R&D/Sales and Patents/R&D because more than 1% of the denominators are 
zero. All the regressions control for industry and year fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered at the industry and year levels (Petersen, 2009). Given that a number of the 
control variables are endogenous choices by the issuing firms and VCs, these regressions 
should be interpreted as indicative of correlation, not causation.  
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
According to Columns (1) to (3) of Table 9, VC-backed IPOs with patents 
experience significantly higher Fama-French alphas than those without patents over the 
three years after the IPO, even after including different sets of control variables. For 
example, the cross-sectional regression estimates in Column (1) show that the regression 
coefficient on the patent dummy is 0.55%, which is economically large and statistically 
significant, with a t-statistic of 2.37, when controlling for firm sales, book-to-market ratio, 
IPO year fixed effects, and industry fixed effects. In other words, VC-backed IPOs with 
patents on average outperform those without patents by 0.55% per month, or annually up 
to 7%, in terms of Fama-French alpha in the three years after the IPO.  
Our results are generally unchanged, with the regression coefficients on patent 
dummy of 0.56% to 0.57% when we further control for additional firm characteristics 
such as capital structure (debt-to-market ratio), financing capacity (cash-to-sales ratio), 
innovation intensity (R&D expenses-to-sales ratio), innovation efficiency (patents-to-
R&D expenses ratio), IPO firm age, and underwriter reputation, as presented in Columns 
(2) to (3).24 Therefore, the predictive power of patents is not driven by these known 
                                                             
24 In unreported results, we find that our findings are robust to the incorporation of VC reputation proxies 
such as VC firm age and VC’s historical assets under management at the IPO (e.g., Nahata, 2008 and 
Krishnan, Ivanov, Masulis, and Singh, 2011), although the sample size drops by more than 50% due to 
missing information on VC characteristics. 
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determinants of the cross-section of stock returns in the literature.  
The regression results in Columns (4) to (6) show that patents also positively predict 
a VC-backed IPO firm’s buy-and-hold market-adjusted returns over the three years after 
the IPO. The outperformance associated with patents is both economically and 
statistically significant, regardless of the model specifications and controls. The 
coefficients on the patent dummy range from 27.7% to 34.6% for the 3-year buy-and-
hold market-adjusted returns.25 
The slope coefficients on the control variables are generally consistent with the 
previous literature. VC-backed companies with larger sales perform significantly better, 
which is consistent with Ritter (2011), who reports that long-run abnormal returns are 
much worse for IPOs with inflation-adjusted pre-IPO annual sales of below $50 million 
in terms of 2005 purchasing power. Consistent with Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) and 
Chan, Cooney, Kim, and Singh (2008), we find that underwriter reputation is 
significantly positively associated with the long run abnormal returns of VC-backed IPOs. 
The book-to-market ratio has a marginally significantly positive effect on the long run 
abnormal performance, especially for the Fama-French alpha. The cash-to-sales ratio, 
R&D expenses-to-sales ratio, and patents-to-R&D expenses ratio have positive impacts, 
and the debt-to-assets ratio, underpricing, and firm age have negative impacts, while the 
explanatory power of all of them is statistically insignificant. 
                                                             
25 In unreported results, we investigate the likelihood of having patent grants and its effects on post-issue 
three-year abnormal stock price performance using Heckman’s two-stage selection regressions, to address 
the concern that the patenting activities may arise endogenously as a consequence of choices made by the 
issuing firms and VCs. The identifying instruments in the first-stage regressions include the industry-
average R&D activity, operating performance, assets, book-to-market ratio, and debt-to-asset ratio for 
publicly traded firms measured at year -3 before IPO. In the second-stage regression, we show that the 
patent dummy is significantly and positively associated with IPO firm long-run performance, even though 
we include the inverse Mills ratio computed from the first-step probit regression as an additional control 
variable for selection bias.  
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5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we examine the predictive ability of patents as a proxy for innovation 
on the long-run performance of VC-backed IPOs using a sample of 2,254 VC-backed U.S. 
IPOs from 1981 through 2006. We find that VC-backed IPOs with pre-IPO patent grants 
strongly outperform those VC-backed IPOs without patent grants in both cross-sectional 
and calendar-time analyses, with 3-year buy-and-hold market-adjusted returns of -7.1% 
vs. -23.3%. Outperformance associated with patents is especially strong in the high-tech 
sector, in patenting firms with low citations, and in large size or value (high book-to-
market) terciles. In contrast, VC-backed IPOs without patents on average perform 
similarly to non-VC-backed IPOs. Although a smaller proportion of non-VC-backed 
IPOs have patents, those with patents also outperform those without patents.  
The outperformance for VC-backed IPOs with patents remains virtually unchanged 
after we control for size, value, profitability, and investment factors. In addition, our 
findings are not driven by the existing innovation-related effects in the cross-section of 
stock returns. For example, the value-weighted calendar-time portfolio of VC-backed 
IPOs with patents earns a 9% annual abnormal return both in Fama-French 3-factor time-
series regressions and after adding the innovation ability factor of Cohen, Diether, and 
Malloy (2013). In contrast, the alpha of the portfolio of VC-backed IPOs without patents 
is insignificantly different from zero. We also control for a large number of firm 
characteristics that may potentially affect IPO long-run performance in a cross-sectional 
multivariate regression framework. Our innovation proxy, a patent dummy, remains a 
strong positive predictor of long-run abnormal returns. 
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The empirical results of this research suggest that IPO investors do not fully 
comprehend the information content in patents, possibly because of the difficulty of 
evaluating the economic implications of such innovation information. This is especially 
relevant for patents that are not widely cited, since such value-relevant information is less 
salient and more uncertain. The results also suggest that for VC-backed IPOs, the ability 
to innovate is a key driver of long-run performance. Innovation measures such as patents 
therefore have important valuation implications in the capital market. 
In addition to documenting that the possession of patents at the time of an IPO is an 
important predictor of subsequent returns for VC-backed IPOs, we also report that the 
positive abnormal performance of VC-backed IPOs has reversed in recent years. In 
particular, VC-backed IPOs from 1981-1998 outperformed other IPOs, but for IPOs from 
both the 1999-2000 internet bubble period and from 2001-2006, the pattern has reversed. 
VC-backed IPOs from 1999-2006 have produced average 3-year buy-and-hold market-
adjusted returns of -36.2%, vs. -2.8% for non-VC-backed IPOs, in contrast to the 1981-
1998 averages of -10.8% for VC-backed IPOs and -28.7% for non-VC-backed IPOs. 
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Figure 1: Average number of patents for VC-backed IPOs before and after the IPO 
 
The sample consists of 2,254 VC-backed IPOs between January 1981 and December 2006. The 
solid line reports the average number of new subsequently successful patent applications per firm 
per event year over [-5, +5] event years relative to the calendar year of the IPO for all the 2,254 
VC-backed IPOs; the dashed line depicts the corresponding average number of new patent grants 
per firm per event year. There are 2,254 firms for event years -5 to -1, which decreases to 1,446 at 
event year +5. The averages for years +1 to +5 are conditional on the firm remaining as a publicly 
traded firm. Patent counts are calculated until the earlier of the event year +5 after the IPO, the 
delisting date, or December of 2006.   
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Table 1: Annual distribution for VC-backed IPOs and patent grants 
 
The sample consists of 2,254 venture capital (VC)-backed initial public offerings (IPOs) between 
January 1981 and December 2006, with 318 growth capital-backed IPOs excluded. The table reports 
the annual number of VC-backed IPOs, and their patent grants over the five calendar years before and 
after the calendar year of the IPO. The last column shows the annual number of VC-backed IPOs with 
patents, which have at least one patent before the IPO. The patent grants data from 1976 to 2006 are 
from the NBER patent dataset, which contains information about all patents that were granted by the 
USPTO from January 1, 1976 to December 31, 2006. There are no requirements that a firm has to 
continue to exist for a full five-year window after the IPO. Patent grants after the IPO are measured 
until the earlier of the end of event year +5 or the delisting date. Year 0 is the calendar year in which 
the IPO occurred. 
 
IPO year 
Number of       
VC-backed IPOs 
Patent grants of      
VC-backed IPOs from 
-5 to -1 years prior to 
the IPO year 
Patent grants of        
VC-backed IPOs from 
+1 to +5 years after the 
IPO year 
Number of VC-backed 
IPOs with patents 
1981  53   31   80   12  
1982  19   5   40   2  
1983  105   88   302   25  
1984  39   12   114   7  
1985  30   2   31   2  
1986  73   34   357   15  
1987  63   19   266   14  
1988  29   22   134   7  
1989  30   23   128   11  
1990  40   28   143   8  
1991  98   101   675   27  
1992  125   146   620   39  
1993  166   205   1,016   50  
1994  118   146   639   27  
1995  161   202   1,150   49  
1996  222   186   1,724   48  
1997  104   94   1,219   24  
1998  61   80   326   16  
1999  259   188   1,421   38  
2000  238   469   2,529   67  
2001  22   44   318   12  
2002  11   31   -   3  
2003  20   148   -   10  
2004  73   463   -   42  
2005  43   170   -   19  
2006  52   187   -   20  
             
Total 2,254  3,124  13,232   594  
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Table 2: Mean accounting characteristics for VC-backed IPOs with and without 
patents 
 
The sample consists of 2,254 VC-backed IPOs between January 1981 and December 2006. Among them, 
2,198 have financial information in COMPUSTAT for the fiscal year during which the IPO occurred. The 
sample size falls to 1,270 five years after the IPO due to delistings. Panels A and B report the average 
values of financials for VC-backed IPOs without and with patents, respectively, based on at least one patent 
grant prior to the time of the IPO. The firm characteristics include the following: inflation-adjusted equity 
market capitalization (in millions of 2006 dollars), inflation-adjusted total assets (in millions of 2006 
dollars), the ratio of book value to the market value of firm’s equity, the ratio of operating income to assets, 
the ratio of net income to assets (ROA), the capital expenditures (CAPEX)-to-assets ratio, the debt-to-
assets ratio, the long-term debt-to-assets ratio, the R&D-to-assets ratio, and the R&D-to-sales ratio. For all 
variables, fiscal year-end values reported in COMPUSTAT are used, which are the values for the fiscal year 
in which the IPO occurred, and one to five fiscal years after the IPO. For example, year +1 for Google, 
which went public on August 19, 2004 and which has a December 31 fiscal year, ends on December 31, 
2005. All accounting variables are Winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
 
 IPO year Year one Year two Year three Year four Year five 
Panel A: VC-backed IPOs without patents 
Market value, $ millions  754  492  516  669  696  776  
Total assets, $ millions  114  186  234  246  302  352  
Book-to-market ratio 0.37 0.57 0.55 0.48 0.46 0.49 
Operating income/assets   -4.9% -10.2% -10.0%   -7.1%   -5.5%   -4.6% 
Net income/assets (ROA) -11.3% -23.4% -27.7% -21.5% -17.4% -16.1% 
CAPEX/assets     7.0%    7.9%    6.4%    5.4%    5.1%    4.7% 
Total debt/assets    8.7%  11.7%  13.5%  14.3%  14.5%  13.8% 
Long-term debt/assets    6.4%    8.5%    9.6%  10.2%  10.4%    9.7% 
R&D/assets  10.1%  13.9%  15.7%  16.3%  15.7%  15.3% 
R&D/sales  0.58  0.62  0.59  0.46  0.43  0.42 
Number of observations 1,604 1,486 1,294 1,133 997 863 
Panel B: VC-backed IPOs with patents 
Market value, $ millions  405  438  432  533  630  584  
Total assets, $ millions 100 145  151  190  228  287  
Book-to-market ratio 0.32 0.46 0.53 0.47 0.47 0.46 
Operating income/assets  -4.9% -10.3% -11.7% -11.3% -10.8%   -7.8% 
Net income/assets (ROA) -9.5% -17.3% -21.7% -21.5% -19.6% -16.9% 
CAPEX/assets    5.3%    6.6%    6.4%    5.5%    5.1%    4.9% 
Total debt/assets   5.3%    6.6%    9.0%  10.4%  11.0%  11.5% 
Long-term debt/assets   3.7%    4.5%    6.6%    7.5%    8.2%    8.8% 
R&D/assets 13.9%  18.3%  20.3%  21.2%  20.2%  19.5% 
R&D/sales 0.81  0.97  0.88  0.73  0.63  0.55 
Number of observations 594 571 530 489 456 407 
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Table 3: Underpricing for VC-backed IPOs with and without patents 
 
The sample consists of 2,254 VC-backed IPOs between January 1981 and December 2006. 
Underpricing is defined as the percentage first-day return, measured from the offer price to the 
closing price. The bubble period is from September 1998 to June 2000, and the normal period 
excludes the bubble period. The percentage starting below the offer price are those IPOs with 
negative first-day returns. Money left on the table is defined as the number of shares offered (not 
including overallotment shares) multiplied by the first day capital gain or loss per share. 
 
IPO characteristics Without patents With patents 
Average underpricing (equal weighted %) 32.0 25.2 
Median underpricing (%) 11.1   9.4 
Standard deviation (%) 61.5 48.1 
Bubble period average (equal weighted %) 95.6 92.3 
Normal period average (equal weighted %) 16.4 16.0 
Percentage starting below offer price (%) 11.2 13.4 
Average money left on the table ($ millions) 25.8 18.3 
   
Number of issues 1,660 594 
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Table 4: Average raw and abnormal percentage returns for IPOs with and without 
patents 
 
The sample consists of 2,254 VC-backed IPOs between January 1981 and December 2006. 
Panels A and B report the average raw and abnormal returns of 1,660 VC-backed IPOs without 
patents and 594 VC-backed IPOs with patents, respectively, based on at least one patent grant 
before the IPO. Panel C reports the results for 4,568 non-VC-backed IPOs. Panels D and E 
respectively report the results of 4,007 non-VC-backed IPOs without patents and 561 non-VC-
backed IPOs with patents, based on at least one patent grant before the IPO. Panel F reports the 
results of all 6,822 IPOs. The equally weighted buy-and hold returns and monthly returns are 
computed on the basis of monthly stock returns ending 24, 36, 48, and 60 calendar months after 
the IPO and starting from the closing market price on the last trading day of the IPO month. The 
buy-and-hold market-adjusted returns and monthly market-adjusted returns are adjusted by the 
value-weighted (VW) NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq market index. FF3 alphas are the intercepts estimated 
by running firm-specific time-series regressions of monthly firm excess returns on the Fama-
French three factors for 24, 36, 48, and 60 months after the IPO. FF5 alphas are the intercepts 
estimated using the Fama-French five factors as independent variables. If the sample firm gets 
delisted, the IPO returns and corresponding benchmark returns are calculated using data up to the 
delisting date. For example, a portfolio with two IPOs that were listed for, respectively, 60 and 25 
months would equally weight the two buy-and-hold returns for the 60-month horizon, but the 60-
month monthly average raw return would be the average of 85 observations. When available, we 
include the firm’s delisting return.  
 
Holding 
periods after 
the IPO 
(month) 
Buy-and-
hold raw 
return (%) 
Buy-and-hold 
market-
adjusted 
return (%) 
Monthly 
raw return 
(%) 
Monthly 
market- 
adjusted 
return (%) 
Monthly  
FF3 alpha 
(%) 
Monthly 
FF5 alpha 
(%) 
Panel A: 1,660 VC-backed IPOs without patents 
24 13.3  -9.8 -0.04 -0.91 -0.38 0.01 
36 12.1 -23.3  0.09 -0.74 -0.25 0.24 
48 29.2 -21.2  0.46 -0.45 -0.19 0.31 
60 34.4 -26.3  0.44 -0.46 -0.17 0.33 
Panel B: 594 VC-backed IPOs with patents 
24 22.0  -3.3 0.83 -0.13 0.21 0.45 
36 28.2  -7.1 0.97  0.14 0.39 0.77 
48 42.6  -8.7 1.30  0.37 0.52 0.87 
60 55.1  -2.9 1.26  0.35 0.47 0.84 
Panel C: 4,568  Non-VC-backed IPOs 
24 13.5 -16.1 0.38 -0.75 -0.46 -0.23 
36 20.7 -24.2 0.40 -0.70 -0.43 -0.07 
48 25.7 -33.6 0.40 -0.69 -0.47 -0.06 
60 31.0 -35.5 0.38 -0.68 -0.49 -0.07 
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Panel D: 4,007 Non-VC-backed IPOs without patents 
24 13.2  -16.3  0.33  -0.80  -0.51  -0.29  
36 19.0  -26.1  0.33  -0.79  -0.50  -0.12  
48 24.0  -35.4  0.32  -0.77  -0.54  -0.12  
60 29.4  -41.1  0.30  -0.77  -0.55  -0.14  
Panel E: 561 Non-VC-backed IPOs with patents 
24 15.0  -14.5  0.67  -0.40  -0.03  0.18  
36 32.9  -12.3  0.95  -0.09   0.20  0.44  
48 38.0  -23.0  0.97  -0.06   0.19  0.42  
60 42.4  -30.8  0.97  -0.04   0.15  0.38  
60 29.4  -41.1  0.30  -0.77  -0.55  -0.14  
Panel F: 6,822 IPOs  
24 14.1  -13.3  0.30  -0.75  -0.38  -0.11  
36 19.2  -22.7  0.38  -0.64  -0.30   0.07  
48 27.8  -28.8  0.49  -0.54  -0.31   0.10  
60 34.0  -33.5  0.47  -0.54  -0.31   0.10  
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Table 5: Three-year performance for VC-backed IPOs with and without patents 
categorized by non-high-tech, high-tech, and biotech industries 
 
The sample consists of 2,254 VC-backed IPOs between January 1981 and December 2006, 
including 1,660 VC-backed IPOs without patents and 594 VC-backed IPOs with patents, 
respectively, based on at least one patent grant prior to the IPO. We further divide the sample 
firms into non-high-tech firms (607 firms without patents and 257 firms with patents), high-tech 
firms (1,053 firms without patents and 337 firms with patents), and biotech firms (163 firms 
without patents and 86 firms with patents). The buy-and-hold returns and monthly returns are 
computed on the basis of CRSP monthly stock returns over the 36 months starting from the end of 
the IPO month. The buy-and-hold market-adjusted returns and monthly market-adjusted returns 
are adjusted by the value-weighted (VW) NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq market index. FF3 alphas are the 
intercepts estimated by running firm-specific time-series regressions of monthly firm excess 
returns on the Fama-French three factors for 36 months after the IPO. FF5 alphas are the 
intercepts estimated using Fama-French five factors as independent variables. If the sample firm 
gets delisted, the IPO returns and corresponding benchmark returns are calculated using data up 
to the delisting date. When available, we include the firm’s delisting return. All of the raw and 
abnormal percentage stock returns are the arithmetic average of VC-backed IPOs within a group. 
 
 Non-high-tech High-tech Biotech 
Panel A: VC-backed IPOs without patents 
Buy-and-hold 3-year raw return (%)      2.5    18.2    -1.9 
Buy-and-hold 3-year market-adjusted return (%)   -35.5   -15.8   -32.4 
Monthly raw return (%) -0.41 0.47 0.75 
Monthly market-adjusted return (%) -1.24 -0.34 -0.04 
Monthly FF3 alpha (%) -0.93 0.17 0.10 
Monthly FF5 alpha (%) -0.64 0.66 0.50 
Number of observations     607   1,053     163 
Panel B: VC-backed IPOs with patents 
Buy-and-hold 3-year raw return (%)     7.9    43.8    20.2 
Buy-and-hold 3-year market-adjusted return (%)   -30.3    10.3   -18.6 
Monthly raw return (%) 0.47 1.35 1.01 
Monthly market-adjusted return (%) -0.42 0.56 0.09 
Monthly FF3 alpha (%) -0.24 0.89 0.16 
Monthly FF5 alpha (%) -0.02 1.37 1.16 
Number of observations     257     337     86 
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Table 6: Three-year performance for VC-backed IPOs with and without patents 
grouped by subperiods 
 
The sample consists of 2,254 VC-backed IPOs between January 1981 and December 2006. Panels A and B 
report the subperiod raw and abnormal three-year stock returns of, respectively, 1,660 VC-backed IPOs 
without patents and 594 VC-backed IPOs with patents. Panel C reports the subperiod returns for all 2,254 
VC-backed IPOs. Panel D reports the subperiod returns for 4,568 non-VC-backed IPOs. The full sample is 
divided into four subsample periods based upon the year of the IPO: 1981 through 1989, 1990 through 
1998, 1999 through 2000, and 2001 through 2006. The buy-and hold returns and monthly returns are 
computed on the basis of monthly stock returns ending 36 calendar months after the IPO and starting from 
the closing market price on the last trading day of the IPO month. The buy-and-hold market-adjusted 
returns and monthly market-adjusted returns are adjusted by the value-weighted (VW) 
NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq market index. FF3 alphas are the intercepts estimated by running firm-specific time-
series regressions of monthly firm excess returns on the Fama-French three factors for 36 months after the 
IPO. FF5 alphas are the intercepts estimated using Fama-French five factors as independent variables. If the 
sample firm gets delisted, the IPO returns and corresponding benchmark returns are calculated using data 
up to the delisting date. When available, we include the firm’s delisting return. All stock return measures 
are expressed in percentages. 
 
Subperiod N 
Buy-and-
hold 3-year 
return (%) 
Market-
adjusted 3-
year BHR 
(%) 
Monthly 
raw return 
(%) 
Monthly 
market-
adjusted 
return (%) 
Monthly 
FF3 alpha 
(%) 
Monthly 
FF5 alpha 
(%) 
Panel A: 1,660 VC-backed IPOs without patents 
1981-1989 346  13.2 -32.8 -0.10 -1.15 -0.79 -0.22 
1990-1998 807  53.3   -8.0  1.36 -0.09  0.15  0.69 
1999-2000 392 -71.4 -50.6 -2.48 -2.03 -0.85 -0.52 
2001-2006 115   9.4  -4.3  0.53  0.10  0.09  0.51 
Panel B: 594 VC-backed IPOs with patents 
1981-1989  95  28.7 -15.7  0.83 -0.26  0.37  0.44 
1990-1998 288  69.1  9.7  1.64  0.18  0.42  0.91 
1999-2000 105 -52.1 -25.4 -0.09  0.68  1.42  1.91 
2001-2006 106  -3.7 -28.0  0.36 -0.12 -0.45 -0.35 
Panel C: 2,254 VC-backed IPOs 
1981-1989  441  16.5 -29.1  0.10 -0.96 -0.52 -0.10 
1990-1998 1,095  57.5  -3.4  1.44 -0.02  0.39  0.82 
1999-2000  497 -67.3 -45.3 -1.98 -1.46 -0.37 -0.01 
2001-2006  221  3.1 -15.7  0.45 -0.01 -0.17  0.09 
Panel D: 4,568  Non-VC-backed IPOs 
1981-1989 1,442  15.5 -29.6  0.32 -0.86 -0.55 -0.34 
1990-1998 2,343  31.8 -28.1  0.69 -0.76 -0.44 0.02 
1999-2000  343 -40.6 -19.7 -1.23 -0.63 -0.17 0.47 
2001-2006  440  26.4  10.5  0.45  0.05 -0.21 0.13 
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Table 7: Three-year buy-and-hold performance for VC-backed IPOs with and without 
patents, by cohort year 
 
The sample consists of 2,254 VC-backed IPOs between January 1981 and December 2006. Panels A and B report 
the subperiod raw and abnormal three-year stock returns of 1,660 VC-backed IPOs without patents and 594 VC-
backed IPOs with patents, respectively, based on at least one patent grant prior to the IPO. Panels A and B 
respectively report the equally and value-weighted 3-year buy-and-hold returns and wealth relatives over the market 
index for VC-backed IPOs without and with patents, respectively, over each cohort year. For each cohort of IPOs 
that went public in a given calendar year, the buy-and-hold returns are calculated by compounding monthly stock 
returns for 36 months from the last trading day of the IPO month. If the sample firm gets delisted, the IPO returns 
and corresponding benchmark market returns are calculated using data up to the delisting date. Wealth relatives are 
calculated as 𝑊𝑖,𝑇 = ∑�1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑇�/∑�1 + 𝑅𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ 𝑖,𝑇�, where 𝑅𝑖,𝑇  is the buy-and-hold return on IPO i for holding 
period of length T (or shorter if there is an early delisting) and 𝑅𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ 𝑖,𝑇 is the buy-and-hold return on the value-
weighted NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq market index over the same period. The value weights are based on the market 
capitalization using the first-day closing prices in CRSP, and are converted into dollars of 2006 purchasing power 
using the Consumer Price Index. For IPOs with dual-class shares, we use post-issue shares outstanding for all share 
classes reported by SDC, with corrections. At the end of each panel, we report the corresponding equally or value-
weighted average 3-year buy-and-hold returns and wealth relatives over the entire 1981-2006 sample period. 
 
 VC-backed IPOs without patents  VC-backed IPOs with patents 
 
Number 
of IPOs 
IPO return 
(%) 
Market 
return (%) 
Wealth 
relatives  
Number of 
IPOs 
IPO return 
(%) 
Market 
return (%) 
Wealth 
relatives 
Panel A: Equally weighted 3-year buy-and-hold returns     
1981  41  11.1 38.7 0.80  12  15.6 36.8 0.85 
1982  17 -20.3 71.9 0.46   2  55.2 66.3 0.93 
1983  80   2.1 54.2 0.66  25   7.7 55.9 0.69 
1984  32   9.1 83.5 0.59   7 -16.5 85.8 0.45 
1985  28 -31.0 47.6 0.47   2 -14.7 46.2 0.58 
1986  58  23.1 37.2 0.90  15  54.8 39.2 1.11 
1987  49  -3.6 19.7 0.81  14   6.6 21.0 0.88 
1988  22  55.5 46.1 1.06   7 175.3 46.0 1.89 
1989  19 129.5 32.9 1.73  11  22.1 32.5 0.92 
1990  32  44.4 51.0 0.96   8  36.1 44.0 0.94 
1991  71   4.0 31.0 0.79  27  31.3 30.1 1.01 
1992  86  18.7 36.2 0.87  39  84.6 34.9 1.37 
1993 116  60.4 51.7 1.06  50  54.2 50.8 1.02 
1994  91 100.3 81.0 1.11  27 196.4 81.5 1.63 
1995 112  25.9 82.6 0.69  49  14.9 85.2 0.62 
1996 174  44.7 82.4 0.79  48 -11.1 81.7 0.49 
1997  80 119.9 61.2 1.36  24 248.0 58.8 2.19 
1998  45  73.6 16.2 1.49  16  82.2 16.1 1.57 
1999 221 -64.9 -14.4 0.41  38 -27.5 -19.6 0.90 
2000 171 -79.8 -29.0 0.28  67 -66.1 -30.7 0.49 
2001  10  13.2   3.4 1.09  12 -25.9  3.4 0.72 
2002   8  34.2 19.2 1.13   3 124.5 22.4 1.83 
2003  10 131.3 46.8 1.58  10 -42.4 74.6 0.33 
2004  31  20.4 43.5 0.84  42  13.4 43.3 0.79 
2005  24   0.2   3.8 0.97  19   -8.5 11.5 0.82 
2006  32 -39.9 -16.2 0.72  20 -21.8 -16.1 0.93 
          1981-2006 1,660 12.1 35.5 0.83  594 28.2 35.4 0.95 
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Panel B: Value-weighted 3-year buy-and-hold returns     
1981  41  31.0 40.0 0.94  12  38.0 41.3 0.98 
1982  17 -43.3 66.3 0.34   2  47.5 66.3 0.89 
1983  80 -25.9 56.2 0.47  25 -36.3 63.6 0.39 
1984  32  -4.5 80.8 0.53   7   -4.6 84.7 0.52 
1985  28 -29.4 48.6 0.47   2 -17.5 48.4 0.56 
1986  58  80.1 36.4 1.32  15  64.1 38.4 1.19 
1987  49   -4.7 20.9 0.79  14   0.8 21.1 0.83 
1988  22  59.7 43.5 1.11   7 228.9 48.9 2.21 
1989  19 149.2 33.2 1.87  11   -9.4 30.5 0.69 
1990  32  86.8 50.3 1.24   8  86.7 43.6 1.30 
1991  71  13.7 31.3 0.87  27  23.2 30.6 0.94 
1992  86  36.4 35.5 1.01  39  83.7 36.7 1.34 
1993 116  45.2 53.0 0.95  50  66.6 53.5 1.09 
1994  91 124.4 83.5 1.22  27 265.3 84.8 1.98 
1995 112  19.8 79.2 0.67  49 -13.3 83.5 0.47 
1996 174 120.8 82.9 1.21  48 -35.7 87.3 0.34 
1997  80 228.7 59.6 2.06  24 364.3 74.0 2.67 
1998  45 153.0 16.2 2.18  16  16.7 12.3 1.04 
1999 221 -82.3 -17.9 0.22  38 -54.0 -21.7 0.59 
2000 171 -89.7 -30.7 0.15  67 -74.8 -30.6 0.36 
2001  10   6.3   0.3 1.06  12 -39.8 0.8 0.60 
2002   8  56.4   8.2 1.44   3 103.4 22.8 1.66 
2003  10 100.1 46.0 1.37  10 -39.8 88.6 0.32 
2004  31  27.0 39.4 0.91  42 273.5 47.0 2.54 
2005  24  54.4   1.8 1.52  19 -18.9 10.7 0.73 
2006  32 -51.6 -19.1 0.60  20 -31.9 -13.2 0.78 
          1981-2006 1,660 -35.6 0.8 0.64  594 33.9 17.3 1.14 
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Table 8: Time-series regressions for calendar-time portfolios of VC-backed IPOs 
with and without patents, and non-VC-backed IPOs 
 
We form the equally and value-weighted monthly calendar-time portfolios of VC-backed IPOs 
without (N=1,660) and with patents (N=594), as well as non-VC-backed IPOs (N=4,568) by 
including all issues that were undertaken in the three years previous to the month of the 
observation. The calendar-time portfolios are rebalanced every month, and the value weights are 
based on the previous month’s month-end market values of the issuing firms. RMRF is the value 
weighted market return on all NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq firms (RM) minus the risk free rate (RF), 
which is the one-month Treasury bill rate. SMB is the difference each month between the return 
on small firms and big firms. HML is the difference each month between the return on a portfolio 
of high book-to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks. IAH is 
the difference each month between the return on a portfolio of stocks with high R&D and high 
innovation ability and the return on a portfolio of stocks with high R&D and low innovation 
ability as in Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2013). The sample period covers the 347 months 
between February 1981 and December 2009. White (1980) robust t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses.  
 
  VC-backed IPOs      
without patents  
VC-backed IPOs            
with patents   Non-VC backed IPOs 
 Equally weighted 
Value-
weighted 
 Equally 
weighted 
Value-
weighted  
Equally 
weighted 
Value-
weighted 
Panel A: Fama-French factors 
Alpha      -0.04% 
(-0.06) 
    0.31% 
(0.97) 
    0.52% 
    (2.18) 
0.74% 
(2.15)  
-0.41% 
(-2.17) 
-0.19% 
(-1.79)   
RMRF 1.44 
(19.34) 
  1.53 
(16.22) 
     1.13 
   (16.66) 
1.20 
(12.34)  
1.25 
(23.54) 
1.19 
(47.26)   
SMB 1.22 
(7.39) 
0.89 
(6.13) 
 1.46 
(14.18) 
1.22 
(5.72)  
0.95 
(8.55) 
0.68 
(14.91)   
HML -0.74 
(-6.53) 
-1.15 
(-8.27) 
 -0.92 
(-10.68) 
-1.25 
(-8.84)  
-0.03 
(-0.29) 
-0.24 
(-5.44)   
R2 0.80 0.78  0.82 0.72  0.83 0.89 
Panel B: Fama-French and innovation ability factors  
Alpha 0.03% 
(0.13) 
0.33% 
  (1.06)  
       0.54% 
(2.21) 
       0.71% 
(2.03)  
     -0.36% 
(-1.80) 
       -0.19% 
(-1.75)  
RMRF 1.44 
(19.71) 
1.53 
  (16.37)  
     1.13 
   (16.70) 
1.20 
(12.26)  
1.25 
(23.57) 
1.19 
(47.17)  
SMB  1.22 
(7.49) 
0.89 
  (6.16)  
1.46 
    (14.18) 
1.23 
(5.73)  
0.94 
(8.94) 
0.68 
(14.96)  
HML -0.75 
(-6.72) 
-1.16 
    (-8.37)  
     -0.93 
   (-10.68) 
-1.24 
(-8.94)  
-0.04 
(-0.46) 
-0.24 
(-5.44)  
IAH -0.04 
(-1.04) 
-0.02 
    (-0.54)  
     -0.02 
     (-0.45) 
0.03 
(0.55)  
-0.05 
(-1.90) 
0.00 
(0.30)  
R2       0.80 0.78        0.82 0.72  0.84 0.89 
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Table 9: Multivariate regression analyses for VC-backed IPOs 
 
The dependent variable for (1) to (3) is the monthly Fama-French 3-factor alpha estimated by running firm-
specific time-series regressions of monthly firm excess returns on the Fama-French factors for 36 months 
after the IPO. The dependent variable for (4) to (6) is the 3-year buy-and-hold market-adjusted return 
adjusted by the value-weighted NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq market index. If the sample firm gets delisted, the 
IPO returns and corresponding benchmark returns are calculated using data up to the delisting date. We 
include a patent dummy equal to one when the firm has at least one patent grant before the IPO. The 
sample consists of 2,254 VC-IPOs between January 1981 and December 2006, which falls to 2,042 when 
we include control variables: the logarithm of inflation-adjusted sales (in millions of 2006 dollars), the 
book-to-market equity ratio (BE/ME), debt-to-total assets ratio, cash holding-to-sales ratio, research and 
development expenses-to-sales ratio, patent grants-to-R&D expenses ratio, underpricing, logarithm of firm 
age, in years, at the IPO, and underwriter reputation (measured on a 0 to 9 scale, with 9 high). All the 
accounting variables are computed using data at the end of the fiscal year of the IPO in COMPUSTAT. 
Variables are Winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels, and the 5% and 99% levels for R&D/Sales and 
Patents/R&D because more than 1% of the denominators are zero. Underpricing and the accounting ratios 
are measured as fractions. All the regressions control for industry and year fixed effects. A constant is 
always included in regressions although not reported. Below each regression coefficient, t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses with the standard errors of the regression coefficients clustered at the industry and 
year levels. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence level, respectively. 
  
 
Monthly Fama-French alpha (%)  
3-year buy-and-hold market-adjusted 
return (%) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Patent dummy     0.55
** 
(2.37) 
   0.56** 
(2.22) 
   0.57** 
(2.21)  
    27.7** 
(2.49) 
    34.6** 
(2.55) 
    34.3*** 
(2.79) 
Log(Sales)  0.21
*** 
(2.76) 
0.37*** 
(3.34) 
0.27** 
(2.38)  
 16.5*** 
(5.07) 
 18.7*** 
(3.71) 
 17.3*** 
(3.02) 
BE/ME  1.14
* 
(1.80) 
1.13* 
(1.81) 
1.09* 
(1.80)  
10.5 
(0.65) 
8.7 
(0.51) 
12.5 
(0.82) 
Debt/assets   -1.77 (-1.55) 
 -1.73 
(-1.49)   
46.3 
(0.63) 
49.3 
(0.65) 
Cash/sales  0.001 (0.74) 
0.001 
(0.53)   
0.04 
(1.29) 
0.04 
(1.08) 
R&D/sales  0.27 (1.39) 
0.19 
(0.92)   
5.26 
(0.77) 
1.74 
(0.23) 
Patent grants/R&D    0.32 (1.28) 
  0.29 
(1.23)   
6.81 
(1.42) 
6.07 
(1.14) 
Underpricing   -0.48 (-1.39)    
-17.1 
(-1.32) 
Log(1+firm age at IPO)   -0.21 (-0.73)    
   -23.5 
(-1.32) 
Underwriter reputation   0.18
** 
(2.37)    
   6.82** 
(2.22) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.097 0.103 0.111  0.068 0.076 0.081 
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 Appendix for 
“Patents, Innovation, and Performance of  
Venture Capital-backed IPOs” 
 
Table A1: List of successful patent filings for some VC-backed IPOs in NBER patent 
database and patent information in the IPO prospectus 
 
Panel A: Number of patent filed and granted in NBER patent database and IPO prospectus 
 Event year of pre-IPO 
successful patent filings in 
NBER database 
  
IPO prospectus 
Firm name IPO Date  -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0   
Google 20040819 Filed 0 10 6 1 10 2  No details 
Granted 0 0 0 0 4 3  No details 
Marvell  
Technology 
20000626 Filed 1 1 5 4 0 0  9 
 Granted 0 1 1 3 2 3  9 
Priceline.com 19990329 Filed 0 0 0 10 2 2  25 
 Granted 0 0 0 0 0 1  2 
Sandisk 19951107 Filed 0 1 0 3 7 19  20 
 Granted 0 0 0 0 0 0  58 
Silicon Image 19991005 Filed 0 1 5 4 7 9  17 
 Granted 0 0 0 0 3 5  4 
Panel B: Descriptions on patents filed and granted before the IPO in IPO prospectus 
Firm name Patent descriptions in IPO prospectus 
Google The first version of the PageRank technology was created while Larry and Sergey 
attended Stanford University, which owns a patent to PageRank. The PageRank 
patent expires in 2017. We hold a perpetual license to this patent. In October 2003, 
we extended our exclusivity period to this patent through 2011, at which point our 
license is non-exclusive. 
 
Marvell Technology As of February 29, 2000, we had been granted nine United States patents on various 
aspects of our technology, with expiration dates ranging from 2015 to 2018, and we 
had filed nine additional United States patent applications. However, there can be 
no assurance that patents will ever be issued for these applications. 
 
Priceline.com We currently hold one issued United States patent directed to a unique Internet-
based buyer-driven commerce method and system underlying our business model. 
We also hold one issued United States patent directed to a method and system for 
pricing and selling airline ticket options and one issued United States patent 
directed to methods and systems for generating airline-specified time tickets. In 
addition, we have pending 25 United States and four international patent 
applications directed to different aspects of our technology and business processes. 
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Sandisk  The Company currently owns or has exclusive rights to fifty-eight United States 
and fourteen foreign issued patents, six patent applications allowed and over twenty 
patent applications pending in the United States, as well as seventeen pending in 
foreign patent offices. 
 
Silicon Image Our success and future revenue growth will depend, in part, on our ability to protect 
our intellectual property. We rely on a combination of patent, copyright, trademark 
and trade secret laws, as well as nondisclosure agreements and other methods to 
protect our proprietary technologies. We have been issued four United States 
patents. We have filed 17 additional United States patent applications. Three of 
these 17 applications have been allowed by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. 
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Table A2: Average raw and abnormal percentage returns for VC-backed IPOs with 
and without patents based on patent applications before the IPO  
 
The sample consists of 2,254 VC-backed IPOs between January 1981 and December 
2006. Panels A and B report the average raw and abnormal returns of 1,628 VC-backed 
IPOs without patents and 626 VC-backed IPOs with patents, respectively, based on at 
least one successful patent filings in event year -3 or earlier prior to the IPO. For example, 
an IPO in 1998 would be classified as having a patent if it has at least one subsequently 
successful filing occurring in 1995 or earlier. In Table 4, the classification of VC-backed 
IPOs with and without patents is based on patent grants before the IPO, irrespective of 
when the filing occurred. The buy-and hold returns and monthly returns are computed on 
the basis of monthly stock returns ending 24, 36, 48, and 60 calendar months after the 
IPO and starting from the closing market price on the last trading day of the IPO month. 
The buy-and-hold market-adjusted returns and monthly market-adjusted returns are 
adjusted by the value-weighted (VW) NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq market index. FF3 alphas are 
the intercepts estimated by running firm-specific time-series regressions of monthly firm 
excess returns on the Fama-French three factors for 24, 36, 48, and 60 months after the 
IPO. FF5 alphas are the intercepts estimated using Fama-French five factors as 
independent variables. If the sample firm gets delisted, the IPO returns and corresponding 
benchmark returns are calculated using data up to the delisting date. When available, we 
include the firm’s delisting return.  
 
Holding 
periods 
after the 
IPO 
(month) 
Buy-and-
hold raw 
return (%) 
Buy-and-
hold 
market-
adjusted 
return (%) 
Monthly 
raw return 
(%) 
Monthly 
market- 
adjusted 
return (%) 
Monthly 
FF3 alpha 
(%) 
Monthly 
FF5 alpha 
(%) 
Panel A: 1,628 VC-backed IPOs without successful patent filings from event year -3 or earlier 
24 10.5 -12.9 -0.18 -1.07 -0.48 -0.09  
36 10.8 -25.5 0.01 -0.85 -0.27  0.14  
48 26.3 -25.4 0.35 -0.57 -0.17  0.22  
60 30.5 -31.4 0.32 -0.58 -0.18  0.24  
Panel B: 626 VC-backed IPOs with successful patent filings from event year -3 or earlier 
24 27.9 5.5 0.96 0.02 0.35  0.68  
36 30.3 -4.6 1.13 0.32 0.64  1.04  
48 46.8 -3.0 1.45 0.59 0.73  1.09  
60 64.3 5.4 1.42 0.58 0.68  1.05  
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Table A3: Means of financials for VC-backed IPOs with and without patents sorted 
on size and book-to-market ratio 
 
The sample consists of 2,254 VC-backed IPOs between January 1981 and December 2006. Among them, 2,195 
have financial information in COMPUSTAT for the fiscal year during which the IPO occurred. Panels A and B 
report the means for VC-backed IPOs without and with patents, respectively, based on at least one patent grant 
prior to the IPO. For each cohort of IPOs issued in a given calendar year, firms are sorted into three size groups 
(“Small”, “Medium”, and “Large”) and three book-to-market ratio groups (“Growth”, “Medium”, and “Value”) 
based on the market value at the first closing price listed by CRSP and the book value of equity for the fiscal year 
in which the IPO occurred. For IPOs with dual-class shares, we use post-issue shares outstanding reported by 
SDC. Both size breakpoints and book-to-market ratio breakpoints are the same for the VC-backed IPOs with and 
without patents in each year. The firm characteristics are equity market capitalization ($2006), total assets 
($2006), the ratio of book value to the market value of firm’s equity, the ratio of operating income to assets, the 
ratio of net income to assets (ROA), the capital expenditures (CAPEX)-to-assets ratio, the debt-to-assets ratio, 
the long-term debt-to-assets ratio, the R&D-to-assets ratio, and the R&D-to-sales ratio. All of the variables 
except market values are measured at the end of the fiscal year during which the IPO occurred using data from 
COMPUSTAT. 
 
 Size Terciles  Book-to-Market Terciles 
 Small Medium Large  Growth Medium Value 
Panel A: VC-backed IPOs  without patents  
Market value (millions of dollars) 158  492  1602   915  704  635  
Assets (millions of dollars) 47  92  223   95  104  145  
Book-to-market ratio 0.42 0.36 0.32  0.26 0.36 0.49 
Operating income/assets  -9.2% -3.4% -1.9%  -10.9%  -6.2%   2.9% 
Net income/assets (ROA) -16.1% -9.6% -8.4%  -18.7% -11.4% -3.5% 
CAPEX/assets   6.7%  7.0%  7.3%   7.4%  6.5%  7.0% 
Total debt/assets  9.3%  8.2%  8.5%   9.0%  5.8% 11.1% 
Long-term debt/assets  5.9%  6.3%  7.0%   6.6%  4.0%  8.5% 
R&D/assets 12.0%  9.9%  8.5%  12.5% 10.5%  7.2% 
R&D/sales 0.72 0.58 0.43  0.61 0.67 0.45 
Number of observations 532 530 542  527 535 542 
Panel B: VC-backed IPOs with patents 
Market value (millions of dollars) 147  250  999   781  231  256  
Assets (millions of dollars) 42  71  220   105  58  137  
Book-to-market ratio 0.36 0.35 0.26  0.31 0.32 0.43 
Operating income/assets  -10.2%  -6.6%  0.6%  -17.7%  -7.5%  3.0% 
Net income/assets (ROA) -14.2% -10.5% -5.1%  -22.3% -10.9% -1.1% 
CAPEX/assets   4.4%  4.6%  6.6%   3.9%  4.9%  5.3% 
Total debt/assets  5.8%  4.9%  5.3%   7.0%  4.1%  4.6% 
Long-term debt/assets  3.8%  3.1%  4.0%   3.7%  2.7%  3.4% 
R&D/assets 15.7% 15.0% 11.3%  18.7% 14.2% 11.6% 
R&D/sales 0.96 0.81 0.66  0.88 0.89 0.71 
Number of observations 208 215 199  251 237 230 
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Table A4: Fama-French-adjusted performance for calendar-time portfolios of VC-
backed IPOs with patents sorted on citations 
 
The sample consists of 594 VC-backed IPOs with at least one patent grant prior to the 
IPO from January 1981 through December 2006. Among them, 432 firms have citation 
data. We form the monthly calendar-time high and low citation portfolios according to 
citation information up to the event year -1 before the IPO year by including all VC-
backed IPOs with patents that were undertaken in the three years previous to the month 
of the observation. We divide the VC-backed IPOs with patents into a low citation 
portfolio with below median number of citation counts and another high citation portfolio 
with above median number of citation counts; and the portfolios are rebalanced monthly 
and firms are allowed to switch portfolios every half year. Both equally and value-
weighted calendar-time portfolios are constructed and the value weights are based on 
previous month’s market values of the firms. RMRF is the value weighted market return 
on all NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq firms (RM) minus the risk free rate (RF) which is the one-
month Treasury bill rate. SMB is the difference each month between the return on small 
firms and big firms. HML is the difference each month between the return on a portfolio 
of high book-to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks. 
The analysis extends between January 1981 and December 2009. White (1980) robust t-
statistics are reported in parentheses.  
 
 Equally-weighted  Value-weighted 
 Low citation High citation  Low citation High citation 
Alpha 0.99% (3.42) 
0.43% 
(1.07)  
1.09% 
(3.03) 
   -0.05% 
(-0.12) 
RMRF 1.11 (13.74) 
1.22 
 (10.81)  
1.21 
  (13.76) 
1.24 
 (11.24) 
SMB 1.45 (9.17) 
1.50 
(9.86)  
1.17 
 (7.36) 
1.43 
 (6.96) 
HML 1.02 (-6.97) 
-1.10 
 (-7.83)  
-1.34 
  (-8.23) 
-1.35 
 (-7.61) 
R2 0.75 0.68  0.60 0.66 
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Table A5: 3-factor time-series regressions for portfolios of VC-backed IPOs with 
and without patents sorted on size and book-to-market ratio 
 
The sample consists of 2,254 VC-backed IPOs between January 1981 and December 2006, including 
1,660 VC-backed IPOs without patents and 594 VC-backed IPOs wit patents based on at least one 
patent grant before the IPO. In Panels A and B, we form the monthly size calendar-time portfolios of 
VC-backed IPOs without and with patents by including all issues that were undertaken in the three 
years previous to the month of the observation. Following Brav and Gompers (1997), we allocate 
equal number of firms into three size portfolios (“Small”, “Medium”, and “Large”) every six months 
based on the previous month's size distribution using all VC-backed IPOs. In Panels C and D, we form 
the monthly book-to-market portfolios of VC-backed IPOs without and with patents by including all 
issues that were undertaken in the three years previous to the month of the observation. Every six 
months we divide the sample into three book-to-market portfolios (“Growth”, “Medium”, and “Value”) 
based on the previous month's book-to-market ratio distribution using all VC-backed IPOs. The 
portfolios are rebalanced monthly and VC-backed IPOs are allowed to switch portfolios every six 
months. Both equally and value-weighted size and book-to-market calendar-time portfolios are 
constructed and the value weights are based on previous month’s market values of the firms. RMRF is 
the value weighted market return on all NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq firms (RM) minus the risk free rate (RF) 
which is the one-month Treasury bill rate. SMB is the difference each month between the return on 
small firms and big firms. HML is the difference each month between the return on a portfolio of high 
book-to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks. The analysis 
extends for the 347 months between February 1981 and December 2009. White (1980) robust t-
statistics are reported in parentheses.  
 
 
  Equally weighted size terciles   Value-weighted size terciles 
 Small Medium Large  Small Medium Large 
Panel A: VC-backed IPOs without patents 
Alpha    -0.24% 
(-0.55) 
   -0.11% 
(-0.38) 
   0.21% 
(0.70) 
     -0.47% 
(-1.23) 
    -0.16% 
(-0.57) 
    0.39% 
(1.10)   
RMRF   1.41 
(11.62) 
  1.43 
(18.10) 
   1.53 
(16.36) 
  1.44 
(12.98) 
  1.39 
(17.63) 
  1.56 
(14.81)   
SMB 1.44 
(5.79) 
1.21 
(6.54) 
0.96 
(7.29) 
 1.35 
(5.77) 
1.19 
(6.75) 
0.76 
(5.19)   
HML -0.29 
(-1.60) 
-0.73 
(-5.79) 
-1.11 
(-7.96) 
 -0.36 
(-2.17) 
-0.80 
(-6.45) 
-1.28 
(-8.00)   
        
R2 0.61   0.80 0.77  0.66 0.79 0.74 
Panel B: VC-backed IPOs with patents   
Alpha     0.47% 
(0.98) 
    0.46% 
(1.20) 
   0.68% 
(2.19) 
     -0.45% 
(-1.01) 
    0.29% 
(0.57) 
    0.96% 
(2.34)   
RMRF 0.95 
(7.41) 
  1.30 
(12.06) 
  1.24 
(13.26) 
 0.97 
(7.37) 
  1.31 
(12.43) 
  1.15 
(10.32)   
SMB 1.55 
(7.95) 
  1.48 
(12.40) 
1.42 
(8.57) 
 1.39 
(7.65) 
   1.41 
(11.78) 
1.21 
(4.49)   
HML -0.69 
(-3.26) 
-0.72 
(-4.20) 
-1.24 
(-9.21) 
 -0.62 
(-3.31) 
-0.73 
(-4.56) 
-1.44 
(-8.49)   
        
R2 0.53 0.78 0.74  0.58   0.77 0.64 
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 Equal-weighted book-to-market terciles  
Value-weighted book-to-market 
terciles 
 Growth Medium Value  Growth Medium Value 
Panel C: VC-backed IPOs without patents   
Alpha    -1.67% 
(-4.82) 
   -0.19% 
(-0.69) 
   1.87% 
(4.15) 
    -1.05% 
(-2.88) 
  0.12% 
(0.37) 
   1.96% 
(4.75)   
RMRF   1.58 
(15.09) 
  1.43 
(17.29) 
1.34 
(15.22) 
  1.63 
(13.76) 
  1.43 
(14.13) 
  1.53 
(14.96)   
SMB 1.05 
(5.92) 
1.15 
(6.53) 
1.40 
(8.40) 
 0.88 
(5.32) 
0.94 
(5.89) 
1.31 
(9.04)   
HML -0.87 
(-5.55) 
-0.79 
(-6.25) 
-0.62 
(-4.76) 
 -1.12 
(-6.89) 
-1.15 
(-7.58) 
-0.75 
(-4.52)   
        
R2   0.76   0.77 0.69  0.75 0.76 0.70 
Panel D: VC-backed IPOs with patents 
Alpha     -1.21% 
(-3.43) 
  0.47% 
(1.34) 
   2.06% 
(6.07) 
     -0.79% 
(-2.01) 
   0.69% 
(1.81) 
  2.13% 
(4.38)   
RMRF   1.12 
(11.78) 
  1.33 
(12.85) 
  1.22 
(10.07) 
    1.07 
(9.98) 
  1.32 
(11.97) 
  1.44 
(11.41)   
SMB    1.17 
(8.91) 
  1.62 
(11.43) 
1.63 
(8.82) 
 1.08 
(5.94) 
  1.72 
(8.06) 
1.44 
(6.39)   
HML -0.98 
(-7.69) 
-0.75 
(-5.56) 
-0.71 
(-3.79) 
 -1.27 
(-7.54) 
-1.06 
(-6.55) 
-0.84 
(-3.84)   
        
R2 0.68 0.77   0.60    0.63   0.78 0.59 
 
 
 
